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AbsTrACT
background Tobacco taxes, as with other ’sin taxes’, 
are generally regarded as a highly cost- effective 
mechanism to reduce consumption but are often 
considered by policymakers to be regressive, undermining 
efforts to fully implement them at levels recommended 
by the WHO due to concerns of fairness. We aim to 
demonstrate whether there are circumstances in 
which the impacts of additional tobacco taxes are not 
regressive, using a standard income- share accounting 
definition of tax burden.
Methods and findings We apply mathematical 
modelling and explore the hypothetical distributions 
in the net change in tobacco taxes and cigarette 
expenditures by income group, following an increase 
in tobacco taxation. The hypothetical distribution 
per income group of additional taxes and cigarette 
expenditures borne by individuals following tobacco 
tax hikes was calculated with respect to a selection 
of parameters including: the change in the retail 
price of cigarettes, the price elasticity of demand for 
tobacco, smoking prevalence, cigarette consumption 
and individual income. We determine the range of 
hypothetical parameter values for which increased 
tobacco taxation should not be considered to penalise 
the poorest income groups when examining marginal 
cigarette consumption expenditures and using an 
accounting definition of tax burden.
Conclusions Our findings question the doctrine 
that tobacco taxes are uniformly regressive from a 
standard income- share accounting view and point to 
the importance of the specific features of tax policy 
to shape a progressive approach to tobacco taxation: 
tobacco tax increases are less likely to be regressive 
when accompanied by a broad framework of demand- 
side measures that enhance the capacity of low- income 
smokers to quit tobacco use.
InTrOduCTIOn
Globally, tobacco smoking is the largest 
single preventable cause of mortality for non- 
communicable diseases, including cardiovascular 
diseases and cancer, and its death toll rose to an 
estimated 7 million premature deaths in 2017.1 As 
an illustration, China now counts more than 300 
million adult smokers,2 resulting in an estimated 
2 million premature deaths each year.1 The total 
number of smokers globally is estimated to be 
almost 1 billion persons and rising year on year in 
absolute terms.3
A comprehensive consensus array of evidence- 
informed tobacco control measures, including 
enforcement of smoke- free zones, advertising bans 
and taxation of tobacco products has been adopted 
with success in many global jurisdictions.4 Impor-
tantly, the World Health Organization’s (WHO)’s 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
(FCTC), now ratified by 181 countries, commits 
those countries to implement an array of tobacco 
control interventions summarised in specific arti-
cles of the FCTC through legislative or regulatory 
actions.5
Taxation of tobacco products is generally regarded 
as the single most cost- effective public health 
strategy for reducing smoking prevalence, through 
promotion of smoking cessation and prevention of 
smoking initiation.6–10 However, few countries have 
implemented taxation policies that meet the criteria 
outlined under the FCTC’s 2005 implementation 
platform, MPOWER,11 which calls for tax rates to 
constitute at least 75% of the final retail price.4 By 
2008, about 20 countries had adopted the recom-
mended taxation on tobacco products, yet in 2018, 
just 40 countries had adopted the FCTC standard.4 
This situation underscores the deadly paradox that 
the most effective tobacco control policy is also the 
least widely implemented of the MPOWER recom-
mendations.11 12
A major reason for the lack or delay in enforce-
ment of large tax hikes on tobacco products is that 
often tobacco taxes are deemed to be inherently 
regressive.13 14 Qualifying taxes of regressive mean 
that they disproportionally hurt the poorest income 
groups: the traditional regressivity argument states 
that less affluent smokers incur proportionately 
greater expenditures on cigarettes compared with 
more affluent smokers; this is the accounting 
definition of tax burden,15 causing greater finan-
cial hardship to a population already impacted by 
problems of tobacco dependence and associated 
diseases.9 14 16 This view makes increasing tobacco 
taxation politically and morally less palatable than 
other measures. International agencies such as 
the WHO and the World Bank have nonetheless 
strongly supported tobacco taxation over the last 
three decades and pointed to the broader consid-
erations of health benefits, mortality reduction, 
curbing out- of- pocket (OOP) health spending and 
reducing the economic burden of tobacco- related 
disease.17 18 However, some notable exceptions 
exist, including the International Monetary Fund, 
which had remained publicly agnostic on the ques-
tion of tobacco taxes until recently. They have also 
now endorsed them.19
As Remler well documents,14 several definitions 
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Figure 1 Conceptual framework summarising the distributional 
accounting model of increased tobacco taxation impacting on the net 
change in tobacco taxes (denoted ΔT(y), varying with income) and 
the net change in cigarette expenditures (denoted ΔC(y), varying with 
income) borne by individuals with income y.
taxes, including: comparing cigarette expenditures relative to 
income (the standard income- share accounting definition—the 
one we take in this paper); examining consumption changes and 
corresponding welfare- based willingness to pay of individuals; 
and considering welfare- based time- inconsistent preferences and 
‘internalities’ of individuals (ie, smokers want to quit but cannot 
in the short term and want a commitment device (ie, higher 
taxes) forcing them to quit in the long term).20
Contesting the traditional view of tax regressivity, based on the 
sole examination of distributional cigarette consumption expen-
ditures, a number of studies have examined broader outcomes of 
tobacco tax policy (including both financial and health measures, 
beyond simply the accounting burden of taxation) for individuals 
and households and have concluded that tobacco taxation can be 
‘pro- poor’ in terms of its totality of effects.21–28 For example, 
tobacco taxation can reduce OOP health expenditures and the 
loss of income from smoking- related disease. Notably, analyses 
by the World Bank24 including from Fuchs and Meneses25 26 
of tobacco taxes call into question the overall regressivity of 
tobacco taxation, and a number of extended cost- effectiveness 
analyses21 23 27 28 have demonstrated an overall progressive distri-
butional impact across income groups of increased tobacco taxes 
when accounting for the additional outcomes of health benefits 
and financial risk protection.
Importantly, Remler,14 using the accounting definition of tax 
burden (net change in cigarette expenditures relative to income), 
qualitatively demonstrates that a tax increase can be progressive for 
certain income gradients in price elasticity of demand for tobacco 
and smoking prevalence. In this regard, a number of studies have 
quantitatively examined this distributional impact of higher tobacco 
taxes while accounting for differential price responsiveness across 
a range of income groups.14 29–35 Specifically, smokers of lower 
income have been shown to be more price sensitive to tobacco 
price increases than smokers of higher income.23 28 29 32 33 36–44 
Likewise, adolescent and young adult smokers (aged 25 years and 
younger) are typically more price sensitive than adults to increased 
cigarette price.45 46 That is, as price increases, decrease in demand 
for cigarettes may be disproprortionately greater among price- 
sensitive populations. Therefore, increased tobacco taxes need 
not be inherently regressive when differential price sensitivity by 
income stratum is considered and thus provide a strategy to target 
price policies to populations with higher smoking prevalence.
In this paper, we aim to ascertain whether there are circum-
stances in which the impacts of additional tobacco taxes are not 
regressive, using a standard income- share accounting definition 
of tax burden. We employ the accounting definition of tax 
burden and study the distribution in the net change in tobacco 
taxes/expenditures following increased taxes. By focusing on 
such an incremental accounting measure of regressivity, many 
might disagree with this consideration of regressivity (ie, incre-
mental vs baseline). We do not argue about how regressivity 
should be defined in the context of tobacco taxation, which we 
acknowledge is constitutive of the debate on whether tobacco 
taxes are deemed regressive, and multiple definitions of regres-
sivity exist. Rather, our accounting focus contributes only one 
piece to this broader debate, which is beyond the scope of our 
paper, and has been well described.14 Specifically, we develop 
a mathematical model to examine the potential distributional 
impact of additional taxes and cigarette expenditures borne by 
individuals across income strata, using a range of hypothetical 
parameter values for the relative price change in cigarettes, 
the price elasticity of demand for tobacco and the prevalence 
of smoking and consumption of cigarettes. Subsequently, we 
highlight under which circumstances (ie, range of key parameter 
values), increased tobacco taxes may or may not be regressive 
from a standard income- share accounting point of view.
MeThOds
Modeling approach
We develop a simple mathematical model to examine the net 
change in the burden of tobacco tax across income groups 
following an increase in the retail price of cigarettes through 
taxation at the population level (figure 1).
The model incorporates the following parameters essential 
in the understanding of increased tobacco taxation: the preva-
lence of smoking  s ; the consumption  c of cigarettes per year (eg, 
the number of cigarette packs consumed by smokers); the retail 
price  p  of cigarettes ( p1  before increased taxation;  p2  after); the 
share  t of tobacco taxes within the retail price of cigarettes ( t1  
before increased taxation;  t2  after); the change in price  δp  (equal 
to the amount of increased taxation  δt = p2 − p1 ); the price elas-
ticity of demand for cigarettes ε ; and  y , the income of a given 
individual in the population. Smoking prevalence, cigarette 
consumption and price elasticity of demand all can vary with 












 . Often, though not 
always, lower income groups smoke more29 47–49 and are more 
price sensitive than more affluent income groups.6 22 28 29 32 33 36–44 
In what follows, for simplicity, we group smoking prevalence 
and consumption in one variable  S(y) (S(y) = s(y) ∗ c(y)) , which 
corresponds to total cigarette consumption (table 1). Impor-
tantly, we use an accounting definition to assess progressivity/
regressivity of increased taxation (eg, net change in taxes and 
expenditures relative to income), which is one (among several 
possible) definition of tax burden as described elsewhere.14
We now present the main elements of the mathematical 
model. Before increased taxation, at the population level, the 
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After increased taxation, at the population level, the total 
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Table 1 Key input variables used in the mathematical model 
depicting the distributional impact of increased tobacco taxation using 
a standard income- share accounting definition of tax burden
Input variable description
 y Individual income.
s (y) Smoking prevalence, varies with income.














 S1 : before increased taxation.





 Price elasticity of demand for cigarettes, varies with income.
 p Retail price of cigarettes
 p1 : before increased taxation.
 p2 : after increased taxation.
 t Share of taxes within retail price of cigarettes
 t1 : before increased taxation.
 t2 : after increased taxation.
 δp = δt  Change in retail price due to increased taxation.







T2(y) = S1(y) ∗
(
1 + δtp1 ∗ ε(y)
)
∗ (t1 ∗ p1 + δt) (2)
Subsequently, we can derive, at the population level, the net 





 ) in the following way:
 ∆T(y) = T2(y)− T1(y) = S1(y) ∗
δt
p1
∗ [p1 + ε(y) ∗ (t1 ∗ p1 + δt)] (3)
Studying the regressivity (income- share accounting view) 









  as a proportion of  y  is greater for lower incomes than for 
higher incomes: this would mean that the tax increase is regres-




  as a proportion of  y  is greater for 
higher incomes, this would mean that the tax increase is progres-




 , studying 
the regressivity implies exploring the monotonous character, 




/y . That is, regressivity 




/y  decreases as  y  increases. Mathemat-
ically, this means that we need to explore the sign of the first 




/y  (see online 
supplementary webappendix, section 1).
Similarly, we can study the net change in cigarette expendi-












 ) at 
the population level. Importantly, the net change in cigarette 
expenditures captures the net financial burden borne (seen) 
by individuals via increased taxation. Given the mathematical 
proximity between the retail price ( p ) and the tax share within 
the retail price ( t ), we can derive mathematical expressions for 
the net change in cigarette expenditures that are consistent with 
those for the net change in cigarette taxes (see online supplemen-
tary webappendix, section 2).
estimates for price elasticity of demand and smoking 
prevalence
There exists an abundant literature that has derived estimates for 
the price elasticity of demand for tobacco products, mostly for 
high- income countries and for low- income and middle- income 
countries.50–52 These studies exhibit aggregate demand estimates 
generally ranging between −1.20 and 0.00. For the USA, aggre-
gate estimates were clustered around −0.60 to −0.20; and for 
low- income and middle- income countries, they varied from 
−1.00 to −0.20. In addition, it was found that lower income 
groups would be substantially more price responsive than higher 
income groups.29 For instance, demand estimates could range 
from −1.00 among the lowest income group to 0.00 among 
the highest income group in the UK and Thailand36 53, and/
or they could be twice as high among the lowest (vs highest) 
income group in the USA, Canada, Korea, Indonesia and 
Turkey.33 35 43 44 54 Lastly, young people are more responsive (two 
to three times45) than older adults to changes in prices of tobacco 
products: demand estimates among young people could be as 
high (in absolute value) as −2.20 or −1.50.46 55 In light of these 
empirical estimates (table 2), in our model, we conservatively 




  ;  ε0 ) 
could vary within −1.00 to −0.20.
With respect to smoking prevalence, our literature 
review29 47–49 found that in a wide variety of countries (high 
income, low income and middle income), there could be as 
many as one to two times more smokers among the lowest (vs 
highest) income group (table 2). Therefore, in our model, we 
assumed that smoking prevalence would decrease as income 
increases, and we applied a variety of negative income gradients 
in smoking prevalence.
Case studies examined
For ease of interpretation, we assumed that price elasticity was 




= ε0 + εg ∗ y  ;  εg  is the 
income gradient in elasticity and  ε0  the elasticity for individuals 
with lower income (ie, the poorest) (note that the young, with 
less disposable income, would be more concentrated among the 
poorest). This is consistent with the expectation that elasticity 
would decrease (in absolute value) with income (table 2). We also 
assumed that smoking and consumption (total cigarette consump-




= s0 + sg ∗ y ;  sg  is the 
income gradient in cigarette consumption and  s0  the consumption 
for the poorest. This would be consistent with the expectation 
that smoking prevalence and consumption decrease with income 
(table 2). Potentially, other mathematical expressions (in lieu of 








  could be selected but would 
unnecessarily complicate our analysis without giving additional 
insight. The resulting mathematical expressions are detailed in the 
online supplementary webappendix, section 3.
We studied parametrically two scenarios. Scenario 1 assumed 




= s0 . 
Scenario 2 relaxed this assumption with  sg ̸= 0 . In our study, 
income was normalised:  0 ≤ y ≤ 1 ;  y = 0  and  y = 1  defined 
lower (poorest) and higher (richest) incomes, respectively. We 
denoted  r = δp/p  the relative change in cigarette price. We then 
examined when the resulting net cigarette taxes and expendi-
tures would be regressive, progressive or neutral across income, 
and we quantified the extent of those situations.
Lastly, we applied our model to a number of country case studies 
including specific populations, time- periods, cigarette retail prices 
and tax regimes, which covered a parameter space drawn from 
empirical studies and reasonable assumptions (table 3).
All mathematical derivations and computations are provided 
in the online supplementary webappendix and were conducted 
using Mathematica (version 11.2.0.0, Wolfram Research, Inc).
resulTs
We report in this section on the examination of the evolution of 
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Table 2 Selected observed estimates for the price elasticity of demand for tobacco products and the prevalence of smoking across income groups, 
various countries and time- periods
Country
Time- period of 
study
data, population and geographical 
setting
estimates of price 
elasticity of demand for 
tobacco products Comments source
Aggregate demand estimates
International Various studies 
1993–2004
Cross- sectional, nationally representative 
studies.
The central theme of this report is an 
examination of the effectiveness of tobacco 
taxation, and an in- depth summary of 
published literature is reviewed and 
synthesised.
50
USA As above. As above. −1.00 to −0.10 (clustered 
around −0.60 to −0.20)
As above. 50
Other high- income 
countries
As above. As above. −1.20 to 0.00 (clustered 
around −0.60 to −0.20)
As above. 50
Low- income and 
middle- income 
countries
As above. As above. −1.00 to −0.20 As above. 50
Latin America and the 
Caribbean
Not restricted. Various: systematic review and meta- analysis 
including 23 studies published between 1998 
and 2015.
−0.51 to −0.35 Analyses included: 10 studies classified as 
‘poor methodology/reporting’; five cross- 
country studies; five using aggregate- level 
data; two using household- level data. No 
studies with individual- level data. Limited 
data quality; quality assessment not formally 
conducted.
51
China 1990–2007 Used official national level statistics from 
China's statistics yearbook, China National 
Bureau of Statistics, China Tobacco Statistics 
Yearbook and China National Tobacco 
Company.
−0.84 to −0.01 China’s state- owned tobacco monopoly set 
prices for much of time- period but since 
2001 foreign brands being sold. Prior to 
2005 tobacco leaf was taxed at 31% of the 
retail price but reduced to 20% in 2006; 
cigarette taxes before 2009 included specific 
excise tax+ad valorem tax for higher priced 
products (class A). Tax structure has in 2009 
changed (increased), but this is not covered 




USA 1993–2003 Six pooled cross- sections from Current 
Population Survey (CPS) Tobacco Use 
Supplements merged with CPS March Income 
Supplements. Complete data for 294 693 
adult respondents.
-0.37 (poor) to -0.20 (rich)
Published data for weighted average state 
price converted into real 1997 values using 
Consumer Price Index. Prices per cigarette 
and consumption of cigarettes per day.
33
USA 1976–1993 Six pooled cross- sections of data from 
the National Health Interview Survey 
administered to a nationally representative 
multistage probability sample of the non- 
institutionalised civilian population aged 
≥18 years.
−0.29 to −0.17 Average real price of cigarettes for each 
state obtained using data reported by 
Tobacco Institute. 80% of overall response 
rate.
37
UK 1972–1990 Pooled biennial cross- sections using a 
random sample of UK adults interviewed for 
general household surveys.
−1.00 to 0.00 Tracks real price of cigarettes over time- 
period relative to other prices and average 
incomes. Prevalence defined by proportion 
of adults smoking >1 cigarette a day and 
combining number of cigarettes smoked 
per smoker by sex/age/SES group to yield 
average consumption per adult per group.
36
Canada 1981–1999 Eight cross- sections of household- level data 
from Canadian Survey of Family Expenditure, 
later renamed Survey of Household spending, 
comprising a total of 81 479 observations.
−0.99 to −0.36 Significant cross- province and time- series 
variation in both federal and provincial 
cigarette taxes over time- period including in 
excise taxes, excise duties and sales taxes. 
Average prices per 200 cigarettes for each 
province between 1989 and 1993 obtained 
from Statistics Canada and province- specific 
prices in other years used to extrapolate 
these figures to the rest of the period and 
combined with data on the total legal sales 
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Country
Time- period of 
study
data, population and geographical 
setting
estimates of price 
elasticity of demand for 
tobacco products Comments source
Korea 1998–2011 Seven pooled cross- sections of individual 
smoking- related records from Korea National 
Health and Nutrition Examination Survey.
−0.81 to −0.34 Real price of a typical 20- cigarette pack 
used. Cigarette manufacturing industry was 
a government- owned monopoly setting 
prices until 2002, when the industry was 
privatised and prices deregulated. Premium 
brands introduced after 2002, but price of a 
typical pack remained unchanged with no 
substantial changes in cigarette taxes over 
time- period. Individual- level data.
43
Indonesia 1999 Single cross- section using Social and 
Economic Survey household data combining 
core and module questionnaires of 60 602 
households. Average per person data derived 
using average household size.
−0.67 to −0.31 Information on cigarette price not available, 
but information on household expenditures 
and cigarettes consumption by brand 
available. Prices paid by smoker households 
estimated from data. Non- smoker household 
prices assumed similar to smoker households 
with similar SES and demographic profiles.
54
South Africa 1990–1998 Combination of subset of nationally 
representative cross- sectional datasets for 
urban respondents: income and expenditure 
surveys of 1990 and 1995; 1993 Southern 
African Labour and Development Research 
Unit survey; 1998 KwaZulu- Natal Income 
Dynamics Survey. Analyses performed on 
16 903 observations. 1990 surveys are 
primarily urban based for the whole country; 
rural respondents are thus excluded from 
analyses.
−1.39 to −0.81 Price variation between brands noted to 
be remarkably low during time- period. 
Analyses investigate consumption patterns, 
and tobacco expenditures on cigarettes 
and other products but focus on cigarette 
expenditures given that these make the 
majority of total tobacco expenditures.
39
Thailand 2000 Cross- sectional household- level data from 
household socioeconomic survey (SES2000) 
with analyses based on 11 968 households 
spending some amount on tobacco monthly.
−1.00 to −0.04 Thais spend 3% of total expenditures on 
cigarettes. Since March 2001 excise tax 
has been 75% of the retail price. Cigarette 
expenditures compared with expenditures 
on other goods at the household level.
53
Turkey 2003 Single cross- section using Turkish Household 
Expenditure Survey (nationally representative, 
randomly selected households) for urban and 
rural areas in 12 regions. Total number of 
households of 25 764.
−1.41 to −0.74 Self- reported cigarette expenditures, and 
consumption and general expenditure 
patterns recorded at household level along 




International Various. Various. −1.44 to 0.00 29 45 50
Low- income and 
middle- income 
countries
1999–2006 Various: merged individual- level data from 
Global Youth Tobacco Survey with country- 
level data on local cigarette prices from 
Economist Intelligence Unit's World Cost of 
Living Survey. Final dataset with 315 355 
individuals of 17 countries corresponding to 
113 cities or provinces.
−2.11 46 55
Low- income and 
middle- income 
countries
1999–2008 Various: estimates on cigarette prices on 
youth smoking derived in 38 countries having 
completed more than 1 wave of school- 
based Global Youth Tobacco Survey, and with 
income and price data.
−2.20 55
High- income and low- 
income and middle- 
income countries




difference in smoking 
prevalence across 
income
Low- income and 
middle- income 
countries
Not restricted. Various: summary of published studies. 1–2 times higher 
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Country
Time- period of 
study
data, population and geographical 
setting
estimates of price 
elasticity of demand for 
tobacco products Comments source
WHO regional analyses Not restricted. Various: systematic review and meta- analysis 
of 93 studies forming 164 datasets for 6 WHO 
regions. Time- period not specified, studies 
published between 1989 and 2013 included.
47
WHO Americas region As above. As above. 1.4–1.7 times higher 
among poor
  
WHO Europe region As above. As above. 1.3–1.6 times higher 
among poor
WHO Southeast Asia 
region
As above. As above. 1.1–2.0 times higher 
among poor
WHO Western Pacific 
region
As above. As above. 1.2–1.6 times higher 
among poor
WHO African region As above. As above. 1.0–1.6 times higher 
among poor
  
For WHO definition of regional grouping: https://www.who.int/about/who-we-are/regional-offices.
*The price elasticity of demand is reported from the lowest (poor) to the highest (rich) income group for which it was estimated in the study.
†The ratio of smoking prevalence between the lowest (poor) and highest (rich) income group is reported for a group of countries as estimated in the study.
SES, socioeconomic status.
Table 2 Continued
net change in additional taxes




= s0 ), 
for the net change in additional taxes to be progressive, the relative 
price change r would need to increase as  ε0  decreases (in absolute 
value) (to remain above the beam of curves; figure 2). The beam of 
curves (blue, purple and red) indicate when the ratio of net taxes 
divided by income is equal across all income groups (which we call 
the ‘neutrality’ frontier). Above the curves (‘progressivity’ area), 
the ratio will increase with income increasing; below (‘regressivity’ 
area), it will decrease with income increasing.
For example, according to the purple curve (figure 2): when 
 ε0 = −1.50  and  r ≥ 0.37  (at least a 37% price increase), when 
 ε0 = −1.00  and  r ≥ 0.70  or when  ε0 = −0.50  and  r ≥ 1.70 , 
then the net change in taxes would be progressive (these  ε0  and 
r estimates (−1.50 and 0.37; −1.00 and 0.70; −0.50 and 1.70) 
are for an initial tax share t1=0.30 (30%) within the retail price 
(neutrality frontier marked by the purple curve on figure 2)). This 
means that progressivity in net taxes would be obtained as long as 
 ε0  and r are sufficiently large (spanning the parameter space above 
the beam of curves), and this progressivity would be mitigated by 
the initial tax share  t1  within the retail price: a higher  t1  would 
require lower neutrality frontier values for  ε0  and r (shift from 
blue to purple to red curve). The bottom- right pink- shaded area 
indicates the parameter space of  ε0  and r for which net taxes would 
be regressive with  t1 = 0.60 . With a null initial tax share  t1 = 0 , 
when price elasticity among the poorest  ε0  equals −1.00, reaching 
the neutrality frontier would require a 100% relative price change 
(r = 1 ); with  t1 = 0.30 , when  ε0 = −1.00 , it would require 
 r = 0.70 ; and with  t1 = 0.60 , when  ε0 = −1.00 , it would require 
 r = 0.40 . Where initial levels of taxes ( t1 ) are low, larger increases 
in retail price are necessary to yield progressivity in net taxes.
In scenario 2, when total cigarette consumption varies across 
income ( sg ̸= 0 ), the net taxes would be progressive as long as 
two conditions are fulfilled. First, consistent with scenario 1, 
 ε0  and r would need to be sufficiently large (same condition as 
described above; figure 2): for example,  ε0 = −1.00  (elasticity 
among the poorest of −1.00) and  r = 0.60 (price increase of 
60%) would fulfil this first condition (with  t1 = 0.50 ). Second, 
provided the former condition is realised, the income gradient 
in price elasticity ( εg , from poorest to richest) and the income 
gradient in cigarette consumption ( sg , from poorest to richest) 
would need to evolve within a certain parameter space.
For instance, take  t1 = 0.50 ,  ε0 = −1.00 ,  r = 0.60,  and ciga-
rette consumption among the poorest of  s0 = 0.30 ∗ 10  (equiva-
lent to smoking prevalence of 30% and daily consumption of 10 
cigarettes). When consumption gradients  sg = −2.0  (eg, corre-
sponding to prevalence spanning from 30% (among the poorest) 
to 10% (among the richest); blue curve on figure 3a), reaching 
full progressivity (horizontal black line) would require elasticity 
gradients  εg < 0.14  (range spanning within −1.00 (among the 
poorest) to −0.86 (among the richest)). When  sg = −1.0  (prev-
alence from 30% to 20%; comparable with gradients in table 2; 
red curve), reaching full progressivity would require  εg < 0.27  
(elasticity spanning within −1.00 to −0.73).
Conversely, when  εg = 1.00  (elasticity spanning from −1.00 
(poorest) to 0.00 (richest); comparable with gradients in table 2; 
blue curve on figure 3b), reaching full progressivity (horizontal 
black line) would require  sg > −0.27  (prevalence from poorest 
to richest within 30% to 27%). When  εg = 0.60  (elasticity span-
ning from −1.00 to −0.40; comparable with table 2 gradients; 
red curve), reaching full progressivity would require  sg > −0.45  
(prevalence spanning within 30% to 25%).
In sum, when gradients in cigarette consumption ( sg ) are large 
(say 1.5 times greater consumption among the poorest than the 
richest; see large coloured points on figure 3c), gradients in price 
elasticity ( εg ) need to be smaller (see 0.20 vs 0.50 points) for net 
taxes to be fully progressive. Conversely, when  sg  gradients are 
small (say 1.1 times greater consumption among poorest; see 
small coloured points on figure 3c),  εg  gradients can be either 
small or large (see 0.10 and 0.80 points) for net taxes to be fully 
progressive. Otherwise, net taxes will only be partially progres-
sive within a certain subgroup of incomes (from  y = 0  (poorest) 
until a cut- off normalised income  y = yc < 1 ).
net change in cigarette expenditures
We now turn to net cigarette expenditures, which captures the 
net financial burden borne (observed) by individuals. In scenario 
1, constant consumption across income ( S1 = s0 ), figure 4 shows 
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Table 3 Selection of country case studies including specific populations, time- periods, cigarette retail prices and cigarette tax regimes
Country Philippines Colombia bulgaria sweden uK
rationale* Lower middle- income 
country; moderate 
smoking (high among 
males); doubled 
excise tax rate over 
2012–2017.
Upper middle- income 
country; recent 
advances in TC policies; 
introduced tax hike in 
2016.
Upper middle- income 
country; high tax rate; 
generally strong TC 
response.
High- income country; 
lower tax rate relative to 
other European countries; 
generally strong TC 
response.
High- income country; 
high tax rate; strong 
TC response.
Income†
GNI per capita (current 
2018 USD)
  3830 6190 8860 55 040 41 340
smoking prevalence*             
WHO age- standardised 
estimated prevalence of 
current cigarette smoking 




















Cigarette consumption*             
Per person per year (ages 
15 years and above, 
2016)‡
Number of cigarettes 1132 351 1282 666 828
Number of 
20- cigarette packs
57 18 64 33 41
retail price and taxes*§             
Retail price, 20- cigarette 
pack, most sold brand 
(USD, 2014–2018)
1.08 1.39 3.21 8.55 12.37
Total taxes on most sold 
brand, 2018
71.3% 78.4% 82.7% 68.8% 82.2%
Tobacco tax hike*§¶             







Retail price of most sold 
brand, prehike (USD)
0.36 0.88 0.80 4.93 7.87
Retail price of most sold 
brand, posthike (USD)
0.62 1.39 1.60 6.37 9.48
Change in price
(USD)
0.26 0.51 0.80 1.44 1.61
Price elasticity§††‡‡             
Aggregate demand 
estimates
−0.87 -0.51 to -0.35 -1.33 to -0.52 −0.50 −0.50
*WHO.60
†World Bank.61
‡Legally sold machine- made and roll- your- own cigarette consumption.
§Yeh et al.62
¶WHO.63
**WHO only has data for every even year.
††Quimbo et al.64
‡‡Sayginsoy et al.65
TC, tobacco control; GNI, gross national income.
elasticity for the poorest individuals ( ε0 ) for which the ratio of net 
expenditures divided by income is equal across income (which 
we call the neutrality frontier). As  ε0  increases, r would need 
to increase (to remain above the red curve) so that net expendi-
tures are progressive: for example, to increase from  r = 0 when 
 ε0 = −1.00 , to r = 1 when  ε0 = −0.50 , and to r = 2 when 
 ε0 = −0.33 . Progressivity would require sufficiently high price 
elasticity (large absolute  ε0  values): for instance, for  r = 0.50 , 
 ε0  would need to be  < −0.66 so that net cigarette expenditures 
are progressive.
In scenario 2, when consumption varies across income ( sg ̸= 0 ), 
the net change in cigarette expenditures will be progressive as long 
as two conditions are fulfilled. First, consistent with scenario 1, 
 ε0  and r need to be sufficiently large (same condition as above; 
figure 4): for example, when  ε0 = −1.00  and  r = 0.60 , this first 
condition is realised. Second, provided this former condition is 
fulfilled,  εg  (gradient in elasticity) and  sg  (gradient in consumption) 
need to remain within a certain parameter space (figure 5).
For instance, take  ε0 = −1.00 ,  r = 0.60 and  s0 = 0.30 ∗ 10  
(corresponding to smoking prevalence of 30% and daily 
consumption of 10 cigarettes for the poorest). When consump-
tion gradients  sg = −2.0  (smoking prevalence spanning from 
30% (among the poorest) to 10% (among the richest); blue curve 
on figure 5a) reaching full progressivity would require elasiticity 
gradients  εg < 0.56  (elasticity span within −1.00 to −0.44 from 
poorest to richest; comparable to gradients in table 2). When 
 sg = −1.5  (smoking prevalence spanning from 30% to 15%; 
purple curve), it would require  εg < 0.75  (elasticity span within 
−1.00 to −0.25; comparable with table 2 gradients).
Conversely, when  εg = 1.00  (elasticity span of −1.00 (among 
the poorest) to 0.00 (among the richest); comparable with table 2 
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Figure 2 Neutrality frontier (blue, purple or red): relative price increase (r ) as a function of price elasticity of demand for the poorest individuals  
( ε0 ) for different values of the initial tax share within the retail price  t1  (0=blue (top), 0.30=purple (middle), 0.60=red (bottom)) for which the ratio of 
net taxes with income is equal across all income groups. Note: the vertical black lines (at  ε0 = −1.00  and  ε0 = −0.20 ) delimit a plausible range 
of price elasticity estimates for the poorest individuals (see estimates from table 2). The bottom- right pink- shaded area indicates a ( ε0; r ) parameter 
space for which the net change in taxes will always be regressive (for an initial tax share within the retail price of  t1 = 0.60 ). The purple points 
display three combinations of the ( ε0 ; r ) parameters ({−1.50; 0.37}, {−1.00; 0.70} and {−0.50; 1.70}) located on the neutrality frontier when the initial 
tax share within the retail price is  t1 = 0.30  (purple curve).
would require  sg > −1.1  (smoking prevalence >19% among the 
richest). When  εg = 0.60  (elasticity span of −1.00 to −0.40; 
comparable to gradients in table 2; red curve), it would require 
 sg > −1.9  (smoking prevalence >11% among the richest).
In sum, when consumption gradients  sg  are large (say 1.5 times 
greater among the poorest than the richest; see large coloured 
points on figure 5c), elasticity gradients  εg  can span the whole 
parameter space (from 0.00 to 1.00) and net expenditures will 
be fully progressive. Likewise, when  sg  gradients are small (say 
1.1 times greater among the poorest; see small coloured points), 
 εg  gradients can also span the whole parameter space and net 
expenditures will be fully progressive. Solely when larger  sg  
gradients (say 2.0 times greater among the poorest) coexist with 
large  εg  gradients (within 0.60 to 1.00) (see blue- shaded area 
on figure 5c), net cigarette expenditures will only be partially 
progressive within a certain subgroup of incomes (from  y = 0  
(poorest) to a cut- off normalised income  y = yc < 1 ).
Instances of progressivity, regressivity and neutrality
We synthesise here our findings by reporting on parameter 
spaces for which we would observe progressivity, regressivity or 
neutrality for the net cigarette expenditures.
First, consider when  sg = 0  (figure 4), we would obtain neutrality 
in net expenditures for the following situations (see blue points on 
the neutrality frontier):  
{
ε0 = −0.90; r = 11%
}









 . Thus, for  ε0 = −0.90 , the ratio of net expen-
ditures divided by income would be equal (neutral) for  r = 11% . 
When  r < 11% , the ratio would be larger for the poorest than 
for the richest; when  r > 11% , the ratio would be smaller for 
the poorest. Similarly, for  ε0 = −0.70 , the ratio would be neutral 
for  r = 43% . When  r < 43% , the ratio would be larger for the 
poorest; when  r > 43% , it would be smaller for the poorest. For 
 ε0 = −0.50 , neutrality would be obtained for  r = 100% . When 
 r < 100% , regressivity would incur; otherwise, progressivity 
would incur. In sum, for large price hikes (50% and more) and 
observable elasticity estimates ( ε0  within −1.00 to −0.50; see 
table 2), net cigarette expenditures would be progressive.
Conversely (examining horizontal purple points on figure 4), 
when setting price increase  r = 50% , when  ε0 = −0.90 , progres-
sivity would incur, with potentially net negative expenditures for 
the poorer ( y = 0.1 ) compared with other income groups ( y ≥ 0.3 ) 
(recall income was normalised: 0≤y≤1; y=0 and y=1 would 
define lower (poorest) and higher (richest) incomes, respectively. 
Therefore, y=0.5 would define median (middle) income; while 
y=0.1<0.5 would define poorer incomes and y=0.9>0.5 would 
define richer incomes). When  ε0 = −0.70 , we would still observe 
progressivity, with a share- income of expenditures 1.8 times 
greater among the richer ( y = 0.9 ) than the poorer ( y = 0.1 ). 
However, when  ε0 = −0.50 , we would see regressivity, with 
a share- income of expenditures 3.2 times greater among the 
poorer than the richer. Likewise, when  ε0 = −0.30 , we would 
see a share- income of expenditures 5.6 times greater among the 
poorer. Lastly, when  ε0 = −0.10 , we would observe regressivity, 
with a share- income of expenditures 7.9 times greater among the 
poorer.
Second, consider when  sg ̸= 0  and take  ε0 = −1.00  (elasticity 
among the poorest) and  r = 0.60 (price increase of 60%). We 
could observe full progressivity (figure 5; online supplemen-
tary webappendix figure S3) for different values of  s0 ,  sg  and  εg  
(online supplementary webappendix, section 4). The likelihood 
of progressivity would increase when: values of consumption 
gradients  sg  are small (combined with either small or large elas-
ticity gradients  εg ); or large values of  sg  are combined with small 
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(A) Varying with income gradient in price elasticity  εg  (while  ε0, r ,  t1 ,  s0 ,  sg  are held constant).
(B) Varying with income gradient in cigarette consumption  sg  (while  ε0, r ,  t1 ,  s0 ,  εg  are held constant). Full progressivity, where the ratio of net 












. Partial progressivity, when  yc < 1;  
and where: the ratio of net taxes with income increases with income for incomes  y  within  0 ≤ y ≤ yc < 1 ; and the ratio of net taxes with income 
decreases with income for incomes  y  within  yc ≤ y ≤ 1 .










) = 1 ): income gradient in price elasticity  
( εg ) as a function of income gradient in cigarette consumption ( sg ) for which the ratio of net taxes with income increases with income across all 
income groups.
Note: figure parts A and B use the following parameter values: initial tax share  t1 = 0.50 , price elasticity for the poorest  ε0 = −1.00 , relative 
price increase  r = 0.60 and total cigarette consumption for the poorest  s0 = 0.30 ∗ 10  (ie, 30% smoking prevalence and 10- cigarette daily 
consumption). In figure part A,  sg  varies from −2.0 (blue (bottom), prevalence from 30% to 10% from poorest to richest), −1.5 (purple (middle), from 
30% to 15%), to −1.0 (red (top), from 30% to 20%). In figure part B,  εg  varies from 1.00 (blue (bottom), elasticity span of −1.00 to 0.00, from poorest 
to richest), 0.80 (purple (middle), span of −1.00 to −0.20) to 0.60 (red (top), span of −1.00 to −0.40). When  y
2
c > 1  (horizontal black line), the net 
change in additional taxes will be fully progressive. Figure part C uses the following parameter values:  t1 = 0.50 ,  ε0 = −1.00 ,  r = 0.60 and 
various values of  s0  :  0.30 ∗ 10 (blue (top), ie, 30% smoking prevalence and 10- cigarette daily consumption),  0.20 ∗ 10 (purple (middle), ie, 20% 
prevalence and 10- cigarette daily consumption) and  0.10 ∗ 10 (red (bottom), ie, 10% prevalence and 10- cigarette daily consumption). The top- left 
blue- shaded area indicates a ( sg; εg ) parameter space for which the net change in taxes will be partially progressive (for  s0 = 0.30 ∗ 10 ).  
The beam of curves (blue, purple and red) indicate the full progressivity frontier: below the beam of curves, the net change in taxes will be fully 


















 ), that is, 1.1 times greater consumption among the 
poorest versus richest.
Third, take selected country case studies (table 3; online 
supplementary webappendix, section 5), we would see a variety 
of outcomes. On the one hand, relative price increases of 72% 
and 100% in the Philippines and Bulgaria, respectively, would 
lead to progressivity in net cigarette expenditures; on the other 
hand, price increases of 58%, 29% and 20% in Colombia, 
Sweden and the UK, respectively, would lead to regressivity in 
net cigarette expenditures.
If addiction were added to our model, it could affect overall 
price elasticity of demand. One could envision a fraction of 
smokers with strong addiction, hence who would not quit or 
reduce consumption with increased taxation (for each income 




 ; see online supplementary 
webappendix, section 6). In this case, if poor smokers were 
more addicted than rich smokers, progressivity in net expendi-
tures could be impacted proportionally to the relative fraction of 
addicted smokers among the poor compared with the rich.
Lastly, in the rare cases of settings where smoking preva-
lence and consumption increase with income (eg, Georgia 
















10 Verguet S, et al. Tob Control 2020;0:1–13. doi:10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2019-055315
Original research
Figure 4 Neutrality frontier (red curve including blue points): relative price increase (r ) as a function of price elasticity of demand for the poorest 
( ε0 ) for which the ratio of net cigarette expenditures with income is equal across all income groups. Note: the vertical black lines (at  ε0 = −1.00  and 
 ε0 = −0.20 ) delimit a plausible range of price elasticity estimates for the poorest (see estimates from table 2). The bottom- right pink- shaded area 
indicates a ( ε0; r ) parameter space for which the net change in cigarette expenditures will always be regressive. The horizontal purple points display 
four combinations of the ( ε0  ; r ) parameters (all for a relative price increase  r = 50% ): {−0.90; 0.50}, {−0.70; 0.50}, {−0.50; 0.50} and {−0.30; 0.50}. 
For {−0.90; 0.50}, {−0.70; 0.50}, the net cigarette expenditures will be progressive (beyond pink- shaded area), while for {−0.50; 0.50} and {−0.30; 
0.50}, the net cigarette expenditures will be regressive (within pink- shaded area).
elasticity among lower incomes, net cigarette expenditures 
would be progressive.
dIsCussIOn
We developed a mathematical model to demonstrate the circum-
stances in which the impacts of additional tobacco taxes are not 
regressive, using a standard income- share accounting definition 
of tax burden. Using an accounting definition of tax burden 
(net expenditures relative to income), we find that increased 
tobacco taxes are not inherently regressive in consumption. 
We demonstrated that for sufficiently large price elasticity of 
demand for tobacco products and large price increases (eg, 50% 
and more), the distribution in net cigarette expenditures could 
be progressive. That is, the model shows that when a susbantial 
price increase (50%–100%) is applied, we can expect a progres-
sive decrease in demand (with ranges in price elasiticity across 
income groups of between −1.00 and −0.20), which would 
translate into fewer people smoking with direct implications for 
improved health outcomes. Such progressivity is conceivable as 
large price elasticities of demand for tobacco among the poor, 
and especially among the young, have been observed in many 
countries (tables 2 and 3), and policies of 50% increases and 
above in the price of tobacco have been enacted in numerous 
countries and would be necessary to bring taxation levels up to 
MPOWER recommendations in many settings.7
Fundamentally, our findings rest on the use of one (among 
many possible) definition of tax burden: the standard income- 
share accounting definition.14 Therefore, using other inter-
pretations of tax burden, increased tobacco taxes could well 
be categorised differently. For example, in spite of progressive 
increases, an already regressive baseline tobacco tax (before 
increased taxation) may remain. Also, our income- share 
accounting ignores individual valuation of consumption changes 
and associated welfare- based willingness to pay of individuals 
who may see foregone utility in reduced cigarette consumption. 
Likewise, income- share accounting does not consider welfare- 
based time- inconsistent preferences and internalities of individ-
uals who may regard taxes as a commitment device forcing them 
to quit in the long term, which they cannot realise in the short 
term.20 In summary, we acknowledge that we approached the 
question of regressivity of tobacco tax from a standard technical 
accounting point of view only, even though this question could 
be scrutinised via multiple economical and philosophical lenses, 
all of which are subject to controversy.
Our mathematical exploration confirms the fact that in specific 
circumstances increased tobacco taxes could lead to reductions 
in the burden of cigarette expenditures borne by individuals, 
as seen under certain scenarios tested via simulation models.23 
In this respect, particularly large tax increases could prevent 
tobacco taxes from being regressive in terms of consumption 
and net cigarette expenditures. This is in addition to large tax 
increases leading to broader health benefits (reduction in prema-
ture mortality and morbidity) and financial risk protection bene-
fits (reduction of impoverishment related to tobacco- related 
disease care and work productivity losses).21 Furthermore, reve-
nues raised via tobacco tax hikes could be redistributed progres-
sively to lower income populations.
Nevertheless, our model presents a number of limitations. First, 
we have made a number of simplifications in the parameter selec-
tion, such as the monotonous nature of some of the inputs, for ease 
of interpretation. However, this would not affect the generalisability 
of our findings. Second, we examined regressivity in consumption 
across income groups at the population level and did not examine 
regressivity within the individuals who continue smoking or 
those individuals who quit smoking. Evidently, as rightly pointed 
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(A) Varying with income gradient in price elasticity  εg  (while  ε0, r ,  s0 ,  sg  are held constant).
(B) Varying with income gradient in cigarette consumption  sg  (while  ε0, r ,  s0 ,  εg  are held constant). Full progressivity, where the ratio of net cigarette 












. Partial progressivity, when 
 yc < 1  and where: the ratio of net expenditures with income increases with income for incomes  y  within  0 ≤ y ≤ yc < 1 ; and the ratio of net 
expenditures with income decreases with income for incomes  y  within  yc ≤ y ≤ 1 .










) = 1 ): income gradient in price elasticity ( εg ) 
as a function of gradient in cigarette consumption ( sg ) for which the ratio of net cigarette expenditures with income increases with income across all 
income groups.
Note: figure parts A and B use the following parameter values: price elasticity for the poorest  ε0 = −1.00 , relative price increase  r = 0.60 , and total 
cigarette consumption for the poorest  s0 = 0.30 ∗ 10  (ie, 30% smoking prevalence and 10- cigarette daily consumption). In figure part A,  sg  varies 
from −2.0 (blue (bottom), prevalence from 30% to 10% from poorest to richest), −1.5 (purple (middle), from 30% to 15%), to −1.0 (red (top), from 
30% to 20%). In figure part B,  εg  varies from 1.00 (blue (bottom), elasticity span of −1.00 to 0.00, from poorest to richest), 0.80 (purple (middle), span 
of −1.00 to −0.20), to 0.60 (red (top), span of −1.00 to −0.40). When  y
2
c > 1  (horizontal black line), the net change in cigarette expenditures will be 
fully progressive. Figure part C uses the following parameter values:  ε0 = −1.00 , and various values of  s0  :  0.30 ∗ 10 (blue (top), ie, 30% smoking 
prevalence and 10- cigarette daily consumption),  0.20 ∗ 10 (purple (middle), ie, 20% prevalence and 10- cigarette daily consumption) and  0.10 ∗ 10 
(red (bottom), ie, 10% prevalence and 10- cigarette daily consumption). The top- left blue- shaded area indicates a ( sg; εg ) parameter space for which 
the net change in cigarette expenditures will be partially progressive (when  s0 = 0.30 ∗ 10 ). The beam of curves (blue, purple and red) indicate the 
full progressivity frontier: below the beam of curves, the net change in expenditures will be fully progressive; above, it will be partially progressive. 
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 ), that is, 1.1 times greater consumption among the poorest versus richest.
individual with inelastic demand (which would include those 
smokers most addicted) would be economically burdened. Conse-
quently, for the subset of persons across income groups who are 
price inelastic and continue smoking, increased tobacco taxes will 
always be regressive.14 For instance, poorer individuals who do not 
quit or reduce consumption would be financially harmed. When 
a greater proportion of those most addicted exists among lower 
(vs higher) income groups, regressivity could be enhanced propor-
tionally with the relatively greater fraction of addicted among 
lower income groups. This can be observed in terms of reduced 
overall price elasticity among lower income groups, thus reduced 
variation in price elasticity across income groups.56 Yet, in the 
absence of empirical data on the distribution of addiction levels 
among smokers of different incomes, such disaggregated analyses 
remain difficult to implement. Overall, this underscores the impor-
tance of implementing tax policy within a broad framework of 
demand- side measures, particularly those that reduce the burden 
of addiction associated with socioeconomic deprivation. Third, 
we used a static model, which assumes immediate impact of the 
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example, we did not consider the ‘stage’ of the cigarette epidemic 
on a per- country basis,57 the prevalence of smoking or factors that 
are associated with future cessation, such as social acceptability of 
smoking, health communications and smoke- free laws.58 Neither 
did we examine long- term net impacts of increased taxes (eg, 
reduction in future tobacco- related medical costs and associated 
catastrophic expenditures; use of new fiscal revenues to roll- out 
interventions promoting equity), which could further improve 
progressivity.24 Fourth, our model did not account for the variety 
in cigarette brands consumed differentially across income groups. 
As lower income individuals would consume cheaper brands, 
increased taxes would likely have a larger impact on the price of 
cheap (vs expensive) cigarettes, thus contributing to a greater price 
response among lower income groups and enhancing tax progres-
sivity. This could also occur in the (rare) instances where smoking 
consumption increases with income (eg, Georgia and Mexico).48 
Lastly, as we used an accounting definition of tax burden, our 
model would not capture welfare dimensions of taxation (willing-
ness to pay for foregone cigarettes, time- inconsisent preferences 
and internalities), estimations of deadweight losses and losses of 
consumer surpluses among lower income individuals no longer 
consuming tobacco that they would value otherwise, all of which 
could enhance regressivity.14 33
However, while relaxing the inherent regressivity of tobacco 
taxes (from a standard accounting viewpoint), our analysis supports 
the importance of increased tobacco taxes in reducing demand for 
smoking, and thus comprising a critical strategy in curbing the 
predicted tobacco death toll for the 21st century.59 In particular, 
specific excise taxes that narrow the gap between cheaper and 
more expensive cigarettes are still underused globally,4 especially 
in emerging economies where they could prevent a burgeoning 
epidemic.
Finally, tobacco taxes are just one type of ‘sin tax’, like taxes on 
alcohol, fats and sugary drinks, where arguments for regressivity 
have hampered broad adoption. Our analysis furthers the case for 
implementation of large increases in tobacco taxation: in addition 
to being life saving, revenue raising and progressive in the totality 
of their effects, we show that under certain circumstances and 
when appropriately targeted to subpopulations with disparate rates 
of smoking, tobacco excise taxes need not be inherently regressive 
in consumption.
What this paper adds?
 ► Tobacco taxes are often considered regressive, undermining 
efforts to fully implement them at levels recommended by 
WHO.
 ► We point to a set of circumstances in which increased 
tobacco taxation should not be considered to penalise the 
poorest income groups, using a standard income- share 
accounting definition of tax burden when examining marginal 
cigarette consumption expenditures.
 ► Our findings question the doctrine that tobacco taxes 
are uniformly regressive from a standard income- share 
accounting view.
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